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| Mahmoud Younis and Gamal Abdel-Nasser |
This month marks the final withdrawal of foreign technicians from the Suez Canal after the 1956 nationalisation that reclaimed Egyptian sovereignty in an act of courage and sacrifice, writes Nader Habib
The nationalisation of the Suez Canal on 26 July 1956 was not only a decision that concerned the management of a vital waterway. It was the culmination of a long history of Egyptian sacrifice that had begun when the digging of the canal was still just an idea, becoming reality as a result of Egyptian labour and then a source of wealth and power for the colonial powers.
The canal’s history is marked by the blood and treasure sacrificed by generations of Egyptians keen to build this vital artery that links East and West and enormously facilitates international trade. Egypt’s geographical position played a profound role in shaping its history, because control of Egypt meant control of a trade route capable of generating vast profits.
Three major publications recount this history. The first, published by the communications arm of the Arab Socialist Union 10 years after the nationalisation of the canal, is titled The Suez Canal Ten Years after Nationalisation. The second, The Suez Canal: Its Political and Strategic Importance and Impact on Egyptian-British Relations from 1914 to 1956 by Mohamed Abdel-Rahman Borg, was published in 1968 by Dar Al-Kateb Al-Arabi. The third, The Suez Files: The Thirty-Year War by Mohamed Hassanein Heikal, was published by Al-Ahram Centre for Translation and Publication in 1986.
The story began on 15 November 1854 when the Frenchman Ferdinand de Lesseps presented a memorandum to the Khedive Said, the then ruler of Egypt, during a journey from Alexandria to Cairo, explaining the importance of the project and its expected international significance. De Lesseps believed Egypt’s position after the canal was built would become strategically comparable to that of Istanbul, the capital of the then Ottoman Empire which controlled the Bosphorus.
The project was connected to the ambitions of the Mohamed Ali Dynasty that then ruled Egypt to free the country from Ottoman control and establish independent rule. Political and economic interests between Said and de Lesseps at this point became intertwined, while the great powers viewed the projected Canal as a strategic route that would be capable of reshaping the balance of power, trade, and politics.
Construction began in 1859 at a time when Said had not yet obtained Ottoman approval and Britain was opposed to the project as a French initiative. De Lesseps initially attempted to attract Egyptian workers by promising wages of six to eight piastres a day, while claiming that European supervisors would be prohibited from mistreating the Egyptian workers. But by May 1861, only about 2,000 workers had responded.
Under pressure from the Suez Canal Company that had been formed to build the canal, Said’s government began conscripting Egyptian workers to work on the canal. The number of workers reached around 7,000, rising to approximately 15,000 by December.
The evidence confirms that Said gave orders for thousands of farmers to be forcibly gathered and sent to the excavation sites of the new canal. Some were reportedly dragged to the sites tied up in ropes, where they faced shortages of drinking water, poor food, disease, and harsh working conditions.
In Port Said, workers depended on water produced by company condensers or transported by ship from Lake Manzala. On one occasion, one of the condensers broke down, and a 60-hour storm prevented water deliveries. The workers were forced to rely on water rations, with each receiving just one litre for all purposes.
Conditions in the desert excavation sites were harsh. The workers laboured under the whips of supervisors and the threat of imprisonment, slept in the open, and suffered from thirst and inadequate food. One complaint from workers from Upper Egypt said that the dry bread distributed to them as food was mouldy and drinking water was scarce.
Diseases spread among the workers, including respiratory infections, chest and eye problems, dysentery, and liver ailments. Nubian workers were among those who suffered most, with company officials often finding them dead, some having succumbed to illness within 48 hours of showing symptoms.
But the Egyptian workers resisted. The history of the canal’s construction includes revolts and mass escapes. When Said sent 5,000 soldiers to the excavation, they refused to work, left the sites, and returned home, with this being followed by clashes with French employees.
Workers from different governorates also fled. Sixty-two men left in a single night, followed on the next night by 199 men brought forcibly to the canal site from Minya in Upper Egypt. Other men from Menoufiya, Gharbiya, Kafr Al-Sheikh, Talkha, and Aswan also escaped, while Upper Egyptian workers fired shots into the air to encourage their colleagues to flee.
HUMAN COST: The Egyptian participation in digging the canal therefore came at a heavy human cost.
Egyptian workers paid with their health and their lives, even as the Suez Canal Company reaped profits that flowed into European pockets. Egypt suffered from major financial problems during the reign of the Khedive Ismail, who succeeded his uncle Said as the ruler of Egypt and Sudan in 1863. The system of forced labour was abolished after the productivity of farms suffered as the farmers were being forced to work on the canal.
Ismail was compelled to pay the company huge sums, and his debts accumulated to the then vast amount of around LE100 million.
The financial crisis was linked to acts of fraud and deception carried out by British and French banks. It ultimately led to the Europeans taking financial control of Egypt, while Britain acquired Egypt’s shares in the Suez Canal Company for an almost negligible sum.
After securing the shares, Britain prepared to occupy Egypt itself in order to control the canal and succeeded in doing so in 1882. The canal thus became more than an economic project and was a fundamental part of the struggle for Egypt.
The 1856 concession agreement for the canal stipulated its neutrality and the neutrality of its ports, along with freedom of navigation and the right of commercial vessels of all nationalities to use it. Britain violated this neutrality, turning the canal into a theatre for its military attack on Egypt in 1882 and occupying Port Said, Ismailia, and Suez.
The canal became a political and strategic weapon of enormous importance. Its economic value was equally significant because it hugely facilitated global trade. For Europe, the canal was a vital artery for food, raw materials, and oil, explaining the colonial powers’ determination to retain control over it.
The Suez Canal Company twisted Egyptian laws, favoured foreigners in employment, and kept Egyptians away from sensitive positions. It informed the French and British authorities about shipping movements and cargoes, enabling the two colonial powers to monitor the movement of strategic materials and learn about other countries’ reserves of raw materials.
NATIONALISATION: The nationalisation of the canal in 1956 was not a sudden decision but followed a long history of foreign monopoly, economic exploitation, colonial interventions, and Egyptian human and financial sacrifice.
Then president Gamal Abdel-Nasser understood that the battle for the canal had to be prepared in advance. On 9 November 1954, he established a body to prepare legal, political, financial, and technical studies of the canal, with the objective of providing trained personnel who could secure navigation and maintain the waterway.
The company had claimed that developing Egyptian expertise in maritime pilotage and engineering would be impossible. Egyptian studies reached the opposite conclusion, arguing that the essential requirements were trained specialists to secure navigation and the technical expertise needed to maintain the canal. Once Egypt was confident that it had enough such personnel, Nasser announced the nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company on 26 July 1956 before a large crowd in Alexandria.
The decision was preceded by political and military preparations. Nasser studied the possible British reaction, particularly because of the presence of British forces in Cyprus. There was a British aircraft carrier in Malta, a destroyer patrolling the area between Cyprus, Alexandria, and Haifa, and three brigades of ground forces in Cyprus.
Nasser selected Mahmoud Younis, head of the Egyptian Petroleum Authority, to implement the nationalisation on the ground. Younis had supervised the construction of the Suez-Mostorod oil pipeline, and Nasser assigned him the responsibility of taking control of the company’s offices in Cairo, Port Said, Suez, and Ismailia.
On the morning of 26 July 1956, Nasser presented the decision to members of the ruling Revolutionary Command Council and the cabinet. They discussed the risks, including possible military intervention and the relationship between the nationalisation of the canal and the financing of the Aswan High Dam.
Nasser rejected the idea of giving prior warning to the West and the idea of only taking over half of the company’s shares, since he said that the essence of the struggle was Egypt’s ability to exercise its will freely. He considered Egypt’s commodity stocks and its financial reserves abroad, seeing these as important factors in the decision. He assumed personal responsibility for the nationalisation.
The operation began during an historic speech by Nasser in Alexandria’s Mansheya Square. Younis was instructed to move as soon as he heard the name “Ferdinand de Lesseps” mentioned in the speech. Nasser eventually repeated the name 13 times, but Younis began moving at the first mention. Nasser then announced that Egypt had taken control of the company’s headquarters in Ismailia and secured the facility.
The political decision to nationalise the canal was thus transformed into operational reality, and Egypt began managing the Suez Canal for the first time in its history.
Nationalisation was a battle of wills. The nationalisation law guaranteed the rights of shareholders and compensation, and Egypt also reaffirmed the freedom of navigation through the Canal. Britain and France responded with political and financial pressure, including the freezing of Egyptian funds. The United States took similar measures, while insurance and freight costs increased.
A further test came when the company, supported by Britain and France, instructed foreign technicians to withdraw from the canal, hoping that Egypt would be incapable of managing it. In mid-September 1956, the technicians withdrew, but navigation did not stop.
The foreign technicians were replaced by Egyptians and by nationals from friendly countries, particularly the former Soviet Union, Greece, and Yugoslavia. Thanks to the courage of Egyptian pilots and the assistance of Greek ones, traffic continued through the canal without interruption. The episode demonstrated Egypt’s ability to manage the canal and had a profound impact on world opinion.
HIGH DAM: The nationalisation of the Suez Canal thus represented the recovery of a right associated with a long history of Egyptian sacrifice.
The building of the Aswan High Dam was one of the reasons that accelerated the decision, and Nasser had devoted considerable effort to this project that was regarded as the largest of its kind in the world and represented a potential economic revolution for Egypt.
Egypt sought financing for the dam from the World Bank, but the United States and Britain opposed contributing to its funding.
On 19 July 1956, the US government withdrew its offer to finance the dam, citing Egypt’s alleged inability to meet its obligations, despite reports indicating otherwise. This meant that Nasser faced a choice between accepting Western conditions and allowing the financing issue to force Egypt to retreat from its development policies and confronting the challenge and turning against colonialism while strengthening nationalist sentiment in Egypt and the Arab world.
On 26 July 1956, he announced that revenue from ships passing through the canal would be allocated to financing the dam, which the United States, Britain, and the World Bank had refused to fund. The canal that had been dug with the blood of Egyptian farmers and had generated profits for foreign powers thus became a source of revenue for a major Egyptian project.
The timing of the canal’s nationalisation was a response to the Western position on financing the dam. At its core, however, it represented a broader economic and political necessity linked to Egypt’s drive for economic independence and the elimination of foreign monopolies, so that its political independence would be accompanied by economic independence.
Britain and France regarded Egypt’s control of the canal as a threat to their interests, and political and economic pressure was followed by military preparations. Then British prime minister Anthony Eden regarded Egyptian control of the canal as a threat to British interests in the Middle East, with the issue also being linked to oil and British influence in the wider region.
The attack on Egypt that took place in 1956, dubbed the Tripartite Aggression by Egyptian historians, was therefore an attempt to overturn the nationalisation of the canal and restore colonial control. After political and economic efforts in this direction failed, Britain and France cooperated with Israel in attacking Egypt.
The plan called for Israel to launch military operations against Egypt followed by a British and French intervention under the pretext of separating the warring forces and protecting freedom of navigation in the canal. Israel attacked Egypt on the night of 29 October 1956, followed by the British and French intervention.
However, this aggression that was intended to force Egypt into submission became another political and moral victory. Egypt’s ability to manage the canal had already been demonstrated, and the Egyptian authorities did not retreat despite political, financial, and military pressure.
The attempt to paralyse the canal after the withdrawal of foreign pilots failed, and the Tripartite Aggression failed to achieve its objective. The later withdrawal of British forces from the canal then demonstrated that the era of direct foreign control over this vital facility had come to an end.
On 26 July 1956, after decades during which Egypt had not had control of a facility that had been dug by its own people, Nasser announced the nationalisation. The subsequent battle to manage the canal proved that the Egyptians who had dug it were also capable of running it.
For Egyptians today, the Suez Canal remains more than a shipping route or source of revenue. It is a site of memory that brings together sacrifice, exploitation, debt, and occupation along with the recovery of national rights and the ability to manage a facility that Egyptians had once been told they were incapable of running.
The High Dam was part of this moment, as the revenue Egypt sought from the canal was part of its response to the refusal to finance this project, underlining the economic independence inherent in the nationalisation. The Tripartite Aggression was the final attempt to force Egypt to retreat. It ended in failure, the canal remained under Egyptian administration, and on 26 July 1956 it became inseparable from the history of modern Egypt.
Between the first blow of the pickaxe in the desert sands and the announcement of the nationalisation there stretches more than a century of dreams, struggle, and suffering linked to the Suez Canal. The canal was not a gift bestowed upon Egypt by colonialism. It is part of Egyptian soil, was dug by Egyptian hands, and was paid for with Egyptian lives and treasure.
The nationalisation of the canal demonstrates that rights can be recovered and that a nation can reclaim what has been lost. The hardest battles are not always those that begin with weapons. Some begin with determination and confidence in a nation’s ability to shoulder its responsibilities.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 17 September, 2026 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly.
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